




Network security

jedimaestro@asu.edu, CSE 365 Fall 2021



Outline

- Internet in a nutshell and the OSI model
 - Ethernet, ARP, IP, TCP, BGP, *etc.*
- Attacks in different layers
 - Off-path vs. in/on-path
- Firewalls and NIDSs
- VPNs
- Port scanning, SYN floods



Some comments

- Bits matter
- Self reliance
 - Linux machine with root
- RTFTB doesn't apply in this class, so really it's RTFSC and RTFM
- These slides have a lot of info, consider it to be an overview and then use the homework as a focal point







Internet in a nutshell...



You want to connect two machines...

- Machines = desktops, laptops, mobile devices, routers, embedded devices, ...



A “hop”




A “hop”

Ethernet




A “subnet”




A “subnet”

ARP = Address Resolution Protocol



A network with routers



More terminology

- IP = Internet protocol
- Forwarding, or “routing”
 - How packets get across the network
- Interface
 - WiFi, cellular, ...
- Path (or “route”), reverse path




IP address

- IPv4 is 32-bits, broken into 4 bytes
 - 192.168.7.8
 - 64.106.46.20
 - 8.8.8.8
- IPv6 is 128 bits
 - 2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334



CIDR

- Classless Inter-Domain Routing
- /27 has a net mask of 255.255.255.224



From Wikipedia


A connection

- For now, just know TCP, UDP, and ICMP
 - Stream sockets vs. datagrams
- TCP and UDP have “ports”
 - Port helps identify a process for incoming packets
 - Open port == “listening”
- Three-way handshake



Process?

Separated by virtual memory, access system resources *via* system calls.




Almost there...

- DNS for resolving hostnames to IPs
 - breakpointingbad.com becomes 149.28.240.117
- BGP to scale to the size of the Internet
 - Path vector protocol
- HTTP as another example of an application layer protocol



OSI model

- 1. Physical
- 2. Link
- 3. Network
- 4. Transport
- 5. Session
- 6. Presentation
- 7. Application



Attacks in different layers



Physical and link

- “Network adjacent”
- Can sniff (promiscuous mode)
- Can spoof
 - ARP cache poisoning
 - Goal is often to pretend to be the gateway




IP and transport layer

- Can spoof
- Can hijack



BGP or DNS

- Can spoof anything that doesn't have crypto
- DNS cache poisoning
- BGP prefix attacks





Firewalls and NIDSs



Firewalls and NIDSs

- Basic idea is to sit in between two machines and apply some policy
- Firewall... “no packets enter my network with destination port 25”
- NIDS: Network Intrusion Detection System....
“Don’t allow TCP connections to send
‘%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3’”





See also "QUANTUM Insert"



In- vs. On-path

- In-path ... Attacker (or “security” device) gets to hold on to the packet and look at it, or modify it, before forwarding it
- On-path ... Attacker (or “security” device) gets a copy, *via* something like a port mirror, but the packet has already been forwarded



Jed's opinion: There is no firewall or NIDS that can't be broken/evaded.



Ptacek and Newsham

- Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection
- Also see the work of Vern Paxson on “Bro” (now “Zeke”)
- The following is an example that uses IP fragments, all images from:

<https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/ip-fragment-reassembly-scapy-33969>






Figure 1: 6 Fragmented Packets (Shankar & Paxson, 2003)(Novak, 2005)

Reassembled using policy: First (Windows, SUN, MacOS, HPUX)



Reassembled using policy: Last/RFC791 (Cisco)



Reassembled using policy: Linux (Linux)



Reassembled using policy: BSD (AIX, FreeBSD, HPUX, VMS)



Reassembled using policy: BSD-Right (HP Jet Direct)




Figure 2: 5 Reassembly Methods (Shankar & Paxson, 2003)(Novak, 2005)




Figure 3: Views of the attacker, IDS and analyst

judyfrags.pcap - Wireshark

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Help

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	08:40:13.533896	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IP	Fragmented IP protocol (pr
2	08:40:13.534327	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IP	Fragmented IP protocol (pr
3	08:40:13.534726	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IP	Fragmented IP protocol (pr
4	08:40:13.535460	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IP	Fragmented IP protocol (pr
5	08:40:13.535820	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IP	Fragmented IP protocol (pr
6	08:40:13.536183	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	IP	[Illegal IP fragments]

Frame 6: 44 bytes on wire (352 bits), 44 bytes captured (352 bits)

Raw packet data

Internet Protocol, Src: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1), Dst: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1)

0000	31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31	11111111 11111111
0010	31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34	11111111 44444444
0020	34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32	44444444 22222222
0030	33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33	33333333 33333333
0040	33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36	33333333 66666666
0050	36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36	66666666 66666666

Note the 111442333666 BSD reassembled payload

Wireshark's reassembly tab on the last fragment in the chain uses the BSD reassembly policy


Frame (44 bytes) Reassembled IPv4 (96 bytes)

File: "judyfrags.pcap" 384 Byte... Packets: 6 Displayed: 6 Marked: 0 Load time: 0:00.000 Profile: Default


Figure 4: Wireshark uses BSD reassembly technique

TCP is even worse...

- <http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/TcpReassembly/>



TTL tricks



“Information only has meaning in that it is subject to interpretation”

–Computer Viruses, Theory and Experiments by Fred Cohen, 1984



“The only laws on the Internet are
assembly and RFCs”

–Phrack 65 article by julia@winstonsmith.info



“Information is inherently physical”

--(*Lots of people said this, but see Richard Feynman's Lectures on Computation*)



OSI model

- 1. Physical
- 2. Link
- 3. Network
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A layer 7 example (XSS) due to Jeff Knockel

- Suppose “`<script>...</script>`” is blacklisted
- Use “`<script>...`” instead, many browsers will happily run the script anyway despite the missing closing tag
- Information only has meaning in that it is subject to interpretation
 - IDS interprets things one way, web browser another



Physical layer injection

- From

https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/woot11/tech/final_files/Goodspeed.pdf







Figure 2: A typical packet's interpretation contrasted with that of a PIP.

Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)...



VPNs



Jed's opinion... VPNs add very little, if anything, in terms of securing tunneled connections (unless you use them as originally intended).



Read the details if you're interested

- breakpointingbad.com, find the blog
- Traditionally, a blind off-path attacker achieves things (like hijacking TCP or DNS) without even seeing the packets coming or going in a connection
- What about a blind in/on-path attacker?



Port scanning and SYN floods, coming soon...
(slides end here for now)

