



Brief overview of post-quantum cryptography
CSE 468 Fall 2023
jedimaestro@asu.edu

To prepare for this lecture...


- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_C5dkUiiQnw
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDdOoYdb748>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K026C5YaB3A>




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit_experiment





Photons or matter (like electrons) produce an interference pattern when two slits are used




Light from a green laser passing through two slits 0.4mm wide and 0.1mm apart




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit_experiment








https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elitzur%E2%80%93Vaidman_bomb_tester




Bomb is either live or a dud






“Due to the way in which the interferometer is constructed, a photon going through the second mirror from the lower path towards detector D will have a phase shift of half a wavelength compared to a photon being reflected from the upper path towards that same detector...”

Put C, *e.g.*, here...



A

B



C



D

E


F




Put D, *e.g.*, here...




If both waves make it to the end (dud!)





We will never detect a photon at
D if the bomb is a dud.


(*I.e.*, if we detect a photon at D
then the bomb is not a dud.)



Bomb is a dud

- Experiment will keep showing a photon detected at C
- Keep repeating until we're as sure as we want to be that the bomb is in fact a dud


Bomb is live




- 50% chance photon takes the lower path
 - Boom!
- 50% chance the photon takes the upper path
 - 50% chance (25% conditional) that the single photon (no longer a wave) goes to detector C
 - Have to repeat
 - 50% chance (25% conditional) that the single photon (no longer a wave) goes to detector D

Bomb is live (keep repeating)

- 2/3rds chance we blow ourselves up
- 1/3rd chance we eventually detect a photon a D
 - No boom, but we're certain the bomb is live





WTF?

- With a decent probability ($1/3$), we learn information about something that *might have happened but didn't*.
- Interaction free experiment
 - Possible in classical physics, e.g., I give you two envelopes and tell you a letter is in one and the other is empty, if you open one you know something about the other.
 - At quantum scales the letter is in a superposition of both envelopes until you observe it
 - These probabilities can be entangled







Image taken from <http://filipchsqroom.blogspot.com/>

Superposition is not enough


- Qubits have to be mutually entangled in very specific ways to implement useful quantum computations
 - Quantum decoherence is a major challenge







<https://www.cnet.com/tech/computing/quantum-computer-makers-like-their-odds-for-big-progress-soon/>

What we need for the Internet to work...

- 
- Symmetric
 - Encryption
 - Authentication
 - Secure hashes
 - Others?
 - Asymmetric
 - Encryption
 - Non-repudiability (signatures)
 - Key exchange
 - Others? (e.g., homomorphic)


Grover's algorithm



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grover%27s_algorithm#/media/File:Grover's_algorithm_circuit.svg


Symmetric crypto

- Double the key size
 - $\sqrt{2^{2n}} = 2^n$
 - $\sqrt{2^{256}} = 2^{128}$




Asymmetric Crypto

- Quantum computers seem to be good at the same kinds of things that make good trapdoor functions for asymmetric crypto (factorization, discrete log, *etc.*)
 - But not everything
 - Older schemes (*e.g.*, Merkle's signature scheme)
 - Newer schemes (*e.g.*, lattice-based)




Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsch%E2%80%93Jozsa_algorithm#/media/File:Deutsch-Jozsa-algorithm-quantum-circuit.png

Shor's algorithm



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm#/media/File:Shor's_algorithm.svg





RSA, DH, ECDH, DSA, *etc.* all broken. Need something else instead..

Lamport signature (1979)

- How to sign a 256-bit message digest...
 - Generate 512 random 256-bit integers (256 pairs of them)
 - Private key
 - For all 512 generate corresponding hash
 - Public key (single use)
 - When you want to sign something, reveal one unhashed private version per pair for corresponding to the bit being 0 or 1 (*i.e.*, the first of the pair for 0, the other for 1)
 - 64 Kbits


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport_signature

Wiretap channel



<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128616302146>


Quantum Key Distribution




<https://imrmedia.in/quantum-key-distribution-test-successfully-demonstrated/>


QKD vs. Quantum-resistant

- QKD uses quantum physics
- Quantum-resistant crypto is performed on classical computers using one-way trapdoor functions that we believe will resist cryptanalysis using quantum computers






<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDdOoYdb748>
Lattice-based cryptography: The tricky math of dots




Alice knows the secret good basis,



Themes

- In schemes based on information theory or physics the eavesdropper has some noise or uncertainty the receiver doesn't have
 - We see this in post-quantum crypto (e.g., learning with errors)
- Quantum computers aren't necessarily faster at everything
 - There's usually a "trick at the end" where all the quantum information gets destroyed but the classical information measured still means something



Why do we care?

- Even schemes with perfect forward secrecy aren't secure against a quantum computer if they're not quantum resistant
 - Can be recorded now, broken later
- TLS, HTTPS certificates, WPA2, WPA3, 4G, 5G, WhatsApp, *etc.* are currently not “future proofed” against quantum computers
 - Signal is, but only very recently