
CSE 468 Fall 2024 Tor lecture

jedimaestro@asu.edu

- Some slides I stole
- Some more slides I stole
- Both are from https://community.torproject.org/training/resources/
- See also
 - https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/

Tor in a nutshell




https://theconversation.com/tor-upgrades-to-make-anonymous-publishing-safer-73641

Why are we learning about Tor?

- Brings together many concepts from the course
 - Encryption, anti-censorship and NIDS evasion, privacy, anonymity, etc.
- A basic network security tool that many people use for many different things

Introduction to Onion Services





Before we begin...

- Do you use Tor?
 - If not, why?
 - O If yes, do you have questions or concerns?
- What do you know about Onion Services?



Table of contents


- 1. Introduction to Tor
- 2. Applications that run on the Tor network
- 3. Introduction to Onion Services (.onion)
- 4. When digital evidence leads to prosecution
- 5. "Deep" or "Dark" Web?
- 6. Hands-on activities (OnionShare)
- 7. Tor secure access package and onion support
- 8. Latest developments



Introduction to Tor




Connecting through **HTTP**






Connecting through **HTTPS**






Connecting through **VPN**






Connecting through **Tor**






Who can see your activity through HTTPS and what can they see?






Who can see your activity through <u>Tor</u> and <u>HTTPS</u> and what can they see?





Different ways of defining Tor

- Tor \Rightarrow free software created at NRL starting 2001/2.
- Tor ⇒ an open network of ~9,500 nodes anyone can join!
- lacktriangle Tor \Rightarrow a browser that connects you to the Tor network.
- Tor \Rightarrow a US non-profit formed in 2006.
- Tor ⇒ a community of volunteers, researchers, developers, trainers, advocates from all over the world.






Fighting the Internet's original sins

- It's <u>Tor</u> (not capitalized).
- The goal is to have a way to use the internet with as much privacy as possible:
 - a. by routing traffic through multiple nodes; and
 - b. by encrypting traffic multiple times hence the term "onion routing".
- Tor provides anonymity, which mitigates against both surveillance and censorship.







We kill people based on metadata

Director of the NSA and CIA

General Michael Hayden





Two sides of the same coin


- Censorship and surveillance go hand-in-hand.
- In order to <u>block</u> access to an online service, censors need to <u>spot</u> when users want to access said service.
- Anonymity grants protection from surveillance and censorship.





What is Tor Browser?

- Just like any other browser (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Yandex) except it does not expose traffic.
- Traffic is encrypted and bounces through three random volunteer-run nodes called relays.
- When using Tor Browser, we don't know who you are or what you're visiting.






Multilingual Browser

Tor Browser is available in many languages:
 https://www.torproject.org/download/languages

 Tor Browser manual is a user-friendly guide for novice users and is also multilingual: https://tb-manual.torproject.org/





Tor Browser on Android

Developed by the Tor Project https://www.torproject.org/download/



Onion Browser on iOS


Developed by the Guardian Project https://onionbrowser.com/





A growing network of relays


- Tor relays and bridges are run by volunteers from around the world, including individuals, NGOs, and companies.
- They form the backbone of the Tor network.
- Today we count: 7000+ relays and 2660+ bridges.





Bypassing censorship of the Tornetwork


- Direct access to Tor may be blocked by some
 Internet Service Providers and governments.
- Tor Browser includes circumvention tools for getting around these blocks called bridges.
- Bridges are relays that are private and harder to block: https://bridges.torproject.org/





Bypassing censorship of torproject.org

- Tor Project website could be blocked on your network.
- Multiple circumvention methods:
 - Mirror websites: https://tor.calyxinstitute.org/
 - Requesting Tor Browser bundle via email: <u>gettor@torproject.org</u>
 - Requesting Tor Browser bundle via Telegram:
 https://t.me/gettor_bot






Applications that run on the Tor network



Operating system


- Tails is an operating system (like Windows and macOS) that can be run straight from a USB.
- Tails \Rightarrow The Amnesic Incognito Live System.
- Tails isolates the connection of all applications through Tor and comes with a set of secure applications.
- An independent project: https://tails.boum.org/





System-wide VPN


- Orbot routes mobile apps' traffic through
 Tor, you can select specifically which apps
 to run through Tor.
- Orbot is available on iOS and Android.
- Developed and maintained by the Guardian
 Project: https://orbot.app/





Secure whistleblowing


- <u>SecureDrop</u> and <u>GlobaLeaks</u> are tools for whistleblowers to communicate securely with journalists.
- Newsrooms around the world have set up their own whistleblowing platforms to receive leaks securely.





Anonymous peer-to-peer messaging

- Ricochet Refresh is an instant messenger that routes all messages through Tor.
- Nobody knows who you're talking to, or what you're talking about.
- Supported by Blueprint for Free Speech:
 https://www.blueprintforfreespeech.net/






Introduction to Onion Services (.onion)





- Onion Services are online services that are only available through the Tor network.
- An Onion Service connects to a rendez-vous node/relay inside the Tor network; and the user wanting to connect to it does the same.
- As a user, you never leave the Tor network when visiting an Onion Service.
- Onion Services provide end-to-end encryption: both visitor and website use Tor (without HTTPS).





Visiting the Intercept's site on Tor Browser vs. visiting the Intercept's onion service








.onion addresses

- Just like any other website, you need to know the address of an onion service in order to reach it.
- The .onion address is automatically generated, so there is no need to purchase a domain.
- An onion address is a string of 56 random letters and numbers followed by ".onion".





Censorship resistance

- Both location and IP address of an Onion Service are hidden, making it difficult to censor or identify who runs the service. Used to be called "hidden services".
- Tor exit nodes can block websites (rare), Onion
 Services never exit the Tor network.
- It's the most censorship-resistant technology available out there as long as the Tor network is reachable.





Metadata obfuscation and elimination

- When you use the Tor network to browse the web you are not sending any information by default of who you are or where you are connecting from.
- The Onion Services use the Tor network to eliminate information about where they are situated.
- Using them eliminates all metadata that may be associated with the service otherwise.



Maximum harm reduction

- Leaving the Tor network still puts users at risk of censorship and other security and privacy risks, Onion Services almost diminish these risks.
- Even if websites are under DDOS, Onion Services could still give access to content of the site (in the case that the onion service itself is not under DDOS!).




Decentralizing the web

- To deploy an Onion Service, you don't need a static or dedicated IP address nor need to purchase a domain and submit it for approval.
- For smaller websites like blogs, there's no need for expensive hardware.
- Deployment is easy: you don't need to forward ports or configure your modem.




Onion-Location

- Onion-Location is an HTTP header that websites can use to advertise their onion counterpart.
- If the website that you're visiting has an onion service, a purple suggestion pill will prompt at the URL bar saying ".onion available".
- When you click it, the website will be reloaded and redirected to its onion counterpart.










Popular Onion Services





Benefits of Onion Services

- 1. Censorship resistance as long as the user has access to Tor.
- 2. End-to-end encryption between user and website.
- 3. Contributing to the decentralization of the web.
- 4. Tor network sustainability.
- 5. Protection of sources, whistleblowers, and journalists.
- 6. Opportunity to educate users about privacy by design.
- 7. Metadata obfuscation and elimination.



Comparison

	Regular Website	Website Over Tor	Onion Service
Censorship Resistance:	Poor Website can easily be censored	Good Censorship still possible via exit nodes	Very good Accessible as long as Tor is reachable, address not censorable
Privacy Safeguards:	Very poor Minimal safeguards: HTTPS, no tracking, hosting jurisdiction, etc.	Good Data correlation is not an eliminated risk	Very good End-to-end encryption for user and service, anonymity for both
Metadata Elimination:	Poor Data about online activity recorded by websites and	Good Data about online activity can be recorded by website	Very good Metadata logging eliminated on both ends, but website
torproject.org	entities passing traffic	if user logs in and identifies themselves	can record data if user logs in

Why Onion Services matter

- Many cases documented where digital evidence has led to prosecution of dissidents, activists, people seeking abortion, etc.
- Ensuring people access your site via your Onion
 Service increases their digital and physical safety.




---snip---

 The above slides continue, see original if you're interested, now plagiarizing some slides about evading censorship...

What do you do when Tor is blocked?

I downloaded Tor Browser, but it won't connect



If this screen takes a long time and does not connect, you may need a bridge or pluggable transport

When torproject.org is blocked


- Mirrors
 - https://tor.eff.org/
 - http://tor.calyxinstitute.org/ (if https is blocked)
- GetTor email: gettor@torproject.org
 - Contact from a Gmail or Riseup account
- Flash drive with Tor on it from someone you trust
- Get the EXE, DMG, tar.xz, don't copy the installed folder
- Downloading Tor Browser from a non-official source is dangerous!




Bridges and pluggable transports


- Bridges are relays that are not listed publicly
- Get bridges directly from Tor Browser (moat)
- Or from the website https://bridges.torproject.org
 or send an email to bridges@torproject.org from a Gmail, or Riseup.net account
- Or get a bridge address from a trusted person
- Pluggable transports can be used like bridges to disguise Tor traffic (also called "built-in bridges")

Bridges and pluggable transports






Request a bridge



Or select a built-in bridge



Pluggable transports

- obfs4: makes Tor traffic look random; works in many situations including China (if not, try meek).
- meek-azure: makes it look like Microsoft traffic; works in China.
- **snowflake**: proxies traffic through temporary proxies using WebRTC (under development). https://snowflake.torproject.org

obfs4 = ScrambleSuit, basically

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.3199.pdf

ScrambleSuit: A Polymorph Network Protocol to Circumvent Censorship

Philipp Winter Karlstad University Tobias Pulls Karlstad University Juergen Fuss
Upper Austria University of
Applied Sciences




Figure 2: ScrambleSuit is a module for obfsproxy which provides a SOCKS interface for local applications. The traffic between two obfsproxy instances is disguised by ScrambleSuit.





Figure 4: The client redeems a valid session ticket \mathcal{T}_t containing the master key k_t . The server responds by issuing a new ticket \mathcal{T}_{t+1} for future use. Both parties then exchange application data.

meek

- "Domain fronting"
- Use a Content Distribution Network the censor won't block
 - Costs money
 - Censors have a business relationship with CDNs

https://snowflake.torproject.org/



Payload By encrypting all ScrambleSuit traffic, we eliminate all payload fingerprints such as Tor's TLS cipher list [12].

Packet length distribution Among other things, we seek to get rid of Tor's characteristic 586-byte packets [16,

36]. We do so by morphing Tor's packet length distri-

bution to a randomly chosen distribution. Inter arrival times Similar to the packet length obfuscation, we camouflage the inter arrival times by employing small and random sleep intervals before writing data on the wire.

OONI

- Open Observatory of Network Interference: <u>https://ooni.torproject.org</u>
- Country-level reports of specific censorship tools in use on certain websites
- View their reports: https://explorer.ooni.org/
- Or use your own OONI Probe to test websites: available in App Store and Google Play.

Now some images plagiarized from... https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/

