# Block cipher modes, stream ciphers, and message authentication

CSE 539 jedimaestro@asu.edu



## Overview

- Review (ECB and CBC mode)
- Why different block cipher modes?
- Stream ciphers (RC4 and WEP as an example)
- CTR mode
- Message authentication
  - HMAC
  - Galois Counter Mode



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode decryption



Original image

Encrypted using ECB mode

Modes other than ECB result in pseudo-randomness

The third image is how the image might appear encrypted with CBC, CTR or any of the other more secure modes—indistinguishable from random noise. Note that the random appearance of the third image does not ensure that the image has been securely encrypted; many kinds of insecure encryption have been developed which would produce output just as "random-looking".<sup>[citation needed]</sup>



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

## Why different block cipher modes?

- Simplicity, security
  - API and lack of education drives many decisions about cipher modes
- Malleability
  - Can be good (error correction, deniability)
  - Can be bad
- Parallelism
- Random access
- Authentication
- Patents?

## Stream ciphers...



https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stream\_cipher.svg

#### "Wired Equivalent Privacy"

-Have to be physically in a building to plug in, have to know the passphrase to join WiFi (or do you?)

#### RC4, 40-bit key, 24-bit IV

#### Following are from:

https://jedcrandall.github.io/courses/cse468fall2022/wep/198fbe890b6 92e5296fcf7ad1b015e653ec9.pdf







If cipher-text & plain-text pair is known, their XOR is a keystream. Known plain-text (LLC/SNAP headers) in IP packets:



Can recover 8 bytes of keystream by eavesdropping a packet.

• Can encrypt (and transmit) 8 bytes of arbitrary data.



## Possible to create statistical biases in the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)

#### More info:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2o3Hs-JDWLs



## Message authentication codes...



## Example: HMAC

- Can make a MAC based on a key, K, and a secure hash function, H
- Why not just use MAC = H(key || message)?

## Example: HMAC

- Can make a MAC based on a key, K, and a secure hash function, H
- Why not just use MAC = H(key || message)?
  - Length extension attacks
- People tried other things like MAC = H(key || message || key)
  - Also has problems

## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC

This definition is taken from RFC 2104:

$$egin{aligned} \mathrm{HMAC}(K,m) &= \mathrm{H}\left(ig(K'\oplus opadig) \parallel \mathrm{H}\left(ig(K'\oplus ipadig) \parallel mig)
ight) \ K' &= igg\{egin{aligned} \mathrm{H}(K) & ext{if $K$ is larger than block size} \ K & ext{otherwise} \end{aligned}$$

H is a cryptographic hash function.

*m* is the message to be authenticated.

K is the secret key.

*K*' is a block-sized key derived from the secret key, *K*; either by padding to the right with 0s up to the block size, or by hashing down to less than or equal to the block size first and then padding to the right with zeros.

denotes concatenation.

⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive or (XOR).

*opad* is the block-sized outer padding, consisting of repeated bytes valued 0x5c. *ipad* is the block-sized inner padding, consisting of repeated bytes valued 0x36.<sup>[3]</sup>

## What to authenticate?

- Plaintext?
- Ciphertext?
- Metadata?
  - E.g., message number, sender, receiver, etc.

### Gallois counter mode...

## Why GCM?

- Both confidentiality and authenticity (integrity)
- Super fast
  - CPU pipeline reasons
  - Parallelism
    - Compare to CBC
- IVs of arbitrary length
- Stream cipher
  - Based on Counter Mode



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GCM-Galois\_Counter\_Mode\_with\_IV.svg



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I (Jed) also stole many images from Wikipedia.

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