Netfilter, NAT, Routing, Firewalls, NIDS

CSE 548 Spring 2023 jedimaestro@asu.edu



The netfilter.org project

What is the netfilter.org project?

The netfilter project is a community-driven collaborative <u>FOSS</u> project that provides packet filtering software for the <u>Linux</u> 2.4.x and later kernel series. The netfilter project is commonly associated with <u>iptables</u> and its successor <u>nftables</u>.

The netfilter project enables packet filtering, network address [and port] translation (NA[P]T), packet logging, userspace packet queueing and other packet mangling.

The netfilter hooks are a framework inside the Linux kernel that allows kernel modules to register callback functions at different locations of the Linux network stack. The registered callback function is then called back for every packet that traverses the respective hook within the Linux network stack.

<u>iptables</u> is a generic firewalling software that allows you to define rulesets. Each rule within an IP table consists of a number of classifiers (iptables matches) and one connected action (iptables target).

<u>inftables</u> is the successor of <u>iptables</u>, it allows for much more flexible, scalable and performance packet classification. This is where all the fancy new features are developed.

Alternatives to Netfilter

- FreeBSD
 - IPFW, natd, IPFILTER, PF
- Russia's TSPU
 - Appears to be a custom implementation and not one of the above
- SOCKS proxies in user space, instead of NAT
 - Used by Tor, ShadowSocks, etc.
- Great Cannon? Great Firewall?
 - I don't know one way or the other (maybe user space stack, or based on Linux, combination of both... who knows?)

Netfilter components Jan Engelhardt, last updated 2014-02-28 (initial: 2008-06-17)



other networking components

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netfilter

Packet flow in Netfilter and General Networking



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netfilter





NAT == Network Address Translation

- Typically between private and public
 - 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12 are private
 - 127.0.0.0/24 is loopback
 - Most of everything else is public (*i.e.*, routable)
- Bogon filtering
 - Internet routers drop packets to/from private IPs (mostly)
- Most of the times you use the Internet you're going through multiple layers of NAT
 - *E.g.*, access points, VPNs, Carrier Grade NAT (CGNAT)



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_address_translation#/media/File:NAT_Concept-en.svg



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier-grade_NAT#/media/File:CGN_IPv4.svg

Routing

- Also called "Layer 3" or "Network Layer"
- Internet routers build routing tables and apply them
 - Using, e.g., BGP
- Hosts also have a lot of routing logic
 - Firewalls, munging, load balancing, multihoming, VPN, etc.

Normal Linux...

jedi@mariposa:~\$ sudo ip route show default via 192.168.69.250 dev enx7298ee2fab68 proto dhcp metric 100 169.254.0.0/16 dev enx7298ee2fab68 scope link metric 1000 192.168.69.0/24 dev enx7298ee2fab68 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.69.58 me tric 100 jedi@mariposa:~\$ ip rule show 0: from all lookup local 32766: from all lookup main 32767: from all lookup default jedi@mariposa:~\$ ip route show table local local 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1 local 127.0.0.1 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1 broadcast 127.255.255.255 dev lo proto kernel scope link src 127.0.0.1 local 192.168.69.58 dev enx7298ee2fab68 proto kernel scope host src 192.168.69.5 8 broadcast 192.168.69.255 dev enx7298ee2fab68 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.69.5 8



Normal Linux with a VPN...

jedi@mariposa:~\$ sudo ip route default via 172.18.11.149 dev tun0 82.102.24.216 via 192.168.69.250 dev enx7298ee2fab68 169.254.0.0/16 dev enx7298ee2fab68 scope link metric 1000 172.18.11.1 via 172.18.11.149 dev tun0 172.18.11.149 dev tun0 proto kernel scope link src 172.18.11.150 192.168.69.0/24 dev enx7298ee2fab68 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.69.58 me tric 100

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:/ # ip route 100.78.150.116/30 dev rmnet_data2 proto kernel scope lin k src 100.78.150.117 :/ # ip rule list from all lookup local 10000: from all fwmark 0xc0000/0xd00000 lookup legacy_sy stem 11000: from all iif lo oif dummyO uidrange 0-0 lookup d ummv0 11000: from all iif lo oif rmnet_data0 uidrange 0-0 loo kup rmnet data0 11000: from all iif lo oif rmnet_data1 uidrange 0-0 loo kup rmnet data1 11000: from all iif lo oif rmnet_data2 uidrange 0-0 loo kup rmnet data2 16000: from all fwmark 0x10063/0x1ffff iif lo lookup lo cal network 16000: from all fwmark 0xd0001/0xdffff iif lo lookup rm net data0 16000: from all fwmark 0xd0065/0xdffff iif lo lookup rm net_data1 16000: from all fwmark 0x10064/0x1ffff iif lo lookup rm net data2 17000: from all iif lo oif dummy0 lookup dummy0 17000: from all fwmark 0xc0000/0xc0000 iif lo oif rmnet _data0 lookup rmnet_data0 17000: from all fwmark 0xc0000/0xc0000 iif lo oif rmnet _data1 lookup rmnet_data1 17000: from all iif lo oif rmnet_data2 lookup rmnet_dat a2 18000: from all fwmark 0x0/0x10000 lookup legacy_system 19000: from all fwmark 0x0/0x10000 lookup legacy_networ 20000: from all fwmark 0x0/0x10000 lookup local_network 23000: from all fwmark 0x64/0x1ffff iif lo lookup rmnet data2 31000: from all fwmark 0x0/0xffff iif lo lookup rmnet_d ata2 32000: from all unreachable

ip rule list

iptables -L

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:/ # iptab Chain INPU target	les -l T (po prot	licy opt	ACCEPT) source			destination	
bw_INPUT	all		anywhere			anywhere	
fw_INPUT	all		anywhere			anywhere	
Chain FORW target	ARD (prot	opt	cy ACCEPT source			destination	
oem_fwd	all		anywhere			anywhere	
fw_FORWARD	all		anywher	e		anywhere	
bw_FORWARD	all		anywher	e		anywhere	
tetherctrl re	_FORW	ARD	all	any	where	an	ywhe
Chain OUTPO target	UT (po prot	olic	y ACCEPT) source			destination	
nm_qti_filt	ter_s	sdp_	dropper	all	anyv	where	
oem_out	all		anywhere			anywhere	
fw_OUTPUT	all		anywhere			anywhere	
st_OUTPUT	all		anywhere			anywhere	
bw_OUTPUT	all		anywhere			anywhere	
Chain bw_F0 target	orwari prot	opt	reference source	es)		destination	
bw_costly_	rmnet_	_dat	a2 all		anywhere		any
where bw_costly_i where	rmnet	_data	a2 all		anywhere		any
Chain bw_II target	prot	(1 r opt	eferences source			destination	
<pre>bw_global_a</pre>	alert	al	1 an	ywhe	re	anywh	ere
bw_costly_	rmnet_	dat	a2 all		anywhere		any
RETURN	esp		anywhere			anywhere	
RETURN	all		anywhere			anywhere	
mark MARK	all		anywhere	1000	00	anywhere	
ESC		C		IT	_		

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ain fw_FORWARD (1 references) irget prot opt source	destination
ain fw_INPUT (1 references) nget prot opt source	destination
ain fw_OUTPUT (1 references) rget prot opt source	destination
ain nm_mdmprxy_doze_mode_skip (0 refer rget prot opt source	ences) destination
aain nm_mdmprxy_iface_pkt_fwder (0 refe rget prot opt source	rences) destination
ain nm_qti_filter_ssdp_dropper (1 refe irget prot opt source	rences) destination
OP udp anywhere	anywhere
udp dpt:1900 OP udp anywhere udp dpt:1900	anywhere
ain oem_fwd (1 references) irget prot opt source	destination
ain oem_out (1 references) Irget prot opt source	destination
ain st_OUTPUT (1 references) rget prot opt source	destination
ain st_clear_caught (2 references) irget prot opt source	destination
ain st_clear_detect (0 references) wrget prot opt source	destination
JECT all anywhere connmark match 0x2000000/0x200000 p-port-unreachable	anywhere 0 reject-with ic
TURN all anywhere connmark match 0x1000000/0x100000 NNMARK tcp anywhere 10025041660226000050011860226	anywhere 0 anywhere 00000000000000000000000000000000000
	eoxodox11110000-

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Chain bw_OUTPUT (1 references) target prot opt source	destination	Chair targe
bw_global_alert all anywhere	anywhere	Chair
bw_costly_rmnet_data2 all anywhere where	any any	REJEC
Chain bw_costly_rmnet_data2 (4 reference target prot opt source	es) destination	mp-po RETUR
bw_penalty_box all anywhere	anywhere	CONNN
REJECT all anywhere ! quota rmnet_data2: 9223372036854 ject-with icmp-port-unreachable	anywhere 4775807 bytes re	0x160 x1000 CONNN
Chain bw_costly_shared (0 references) target prot opt source	destination	>>0x1 RETUR
bw_penalty_box all anywhere	anywhere	st_cl
Chain bw_data_saver (1 references) target prot opt source	destination	x1a&0 st_c1
RETURN all anywhere	anywhere	Chair
Chain bw_global_alert (2 references) target prot opt source	destination	
all anywhere ! quota globalAlert: 2097152 byte:	anywhere s	NI LOC
Chain bw_happy_box (1 references)	destination	Chain targe
	descination	CONN
match bpf pinned /sys/fs/bpf/netd_:	shared/prog_netd_	NFLOG
bw_data_saver all anywhere	anywhere	REJEC
Chain bw_penalty_box (2 references) target prot opt source	destination	Chair targe
REJECT all anywhere match bpf pinned /sys/fs/bpf/netd_s	anywhere shared/prog_netd_	DROP
skfilter_denylist_xtbpf reject-with icmp e bw happy box all anywhere	anywhere	Chair
		:/ #

CTR

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in st clear caught	(2 references)	
get protopt so	urce	destination
	(0	
get protopt so	(U references) urce	destination
ECT all an	vwhere	anywhere
connmark match	0x2000000/0x2000000	reject-with ic
port-unreachable		
URN all an	where	anywhere
MARK tro == an	where	anywhere
u32 "0x0>>0x1680	x3c@0xc>>0x1a&0x3c@	0x0&0xffff0000=
6030000&&0x0>>0x16& 000" CONNMARK or 0x	0x3c@0xc>>0x1a&0x3c 1000000	@0x4&0xff0000=0
NMARK udp an	ywhere	anywhere
u32 "0x0>>0x16&0	x3c@0x8&0xffff0000=	0x16fe0000&&0x0
x16&0x3c@0x14&0xff0	000=0x10000" CONNMA	RK or 0x1000000
JKN all an	ywnere 0x1000000/0x1000000	anywnere
clear caught ton	anywhere	anywhere
state ESTA	BLISHED u32 "0x0>>0	x16&0x3c@0xc>>0
clear caught udo	anwhere	anywhere
creat _cadenc adp	anymiere	arrywiter e
in st_penalty_log (0 references)	
get protopt so	urce	destination
NMARK all an	ywhere	anywhere
CUNNMARK OF UX10	uuuuuu	anvilhere
oo arr an	ymilere	anymiere
in st_penalty_rejec	t (O references)	
get protoptso	urce	destination
MARK all an	ywhere	anywhere
og all an	ywhere	anywhere
ECT all an	where	anywhere
reject-with icmp	-port-unreachable	arrywhere
	00 (1	
in tetherctr1_FORWA	RD (1 references)	dectination
get protopt so	urce	descination
P all an	ywhere	anywhere
in cetherctr1_count	ers (0 references)	doctination
ger procopt so	urce	descinacion
#		

Chain nm_ target	_qti_filter_ prot opt	_ssdp_dropper source	(1	references) destination
DROP	udp	anywhere		anywhere
DROP udp	udp	anywhere		anywhere

REJECT all -- anywhere anywhere connmark match 0x2000000/0x2000000 reject-with ic mp-port-unreachable RETURN all -- anywhere anywhere connmark match 0x1000000/0x1000000 CONNMARK tcp -- anywhere anywhere u32 "0x0>>0x16&0x3c@0xc>>0x1a&0x3c@0x0&0xffff0000= 0x16030000&&0x0>>0x16&0x3c@0xc>>0x1a&0x3c@0x4&0xff0000=0 x10000" CONNMARK or 0x1000000 CONNMARK udp -- anywhere anywhere u32 "0x0>>0x16&0x3c@0x8&0xffff0000=0x16fe0000&&0x0 >>0x16&0x3c@0x14&0xff0000=0x10000" CONNMARK or 0x1000000 RETURN all -- anywhere anywhere connmark match 0x1000000/0x1000000

st_clear_caught tcp -- anywhere anywhere
 state ESTABLISHED u32 "0x0>>0x16&0x3c@0xc>>0
x1a&0x3c@0x0&0x0=0x0"

st_clear_caught udp -- anywhere

anywhere



Stateful vs. stateless

• Stateful has to refer to conntrack (or something like it)

ACCEPT	all	 anywhere	192.168.122.0/24	ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISH
ACCEPT	all	 192.168.122.0/24	anywhere	

• Stateless does not need to refer to conntrack

ACCEPT	all	 8.8.8.8	anywhere

conntrack

marek@mrnew:~\$ sudo conntrack -L

6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=85.10.202.207 sport=53370 dport=443 src=8 tcp 6 96 TIME WAIT src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.201.174 sport=46610 dport=443 src=216.58 tcp tcp 6 431996 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.201.142 sport=56838 dport=443 src= 6 431993 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.201.131 sport=58700 dport=443 src= tcp 6 431977 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.211.37 sport=36436 dport=443 src=2 tcp 6 431968 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.201.138 sport=50936 dport=443 src= tcp 6 431997 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=64.233.184.189 sport=39562 dport=443 src= tcp 6 431979 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=172.217.168.174 sport=51622 dport=443 src tcp 6 263 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.211.37 sport=36428 dport=443 src=216. tcp tcp 6 431991 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=172.217.168.174 sport=51570 dport=443 src 6 431996 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=147.135.78.157 sport=39234 dport=443 src= tcp 6 273 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=172.217.17.10 sport=46478 dport=443 src=172. tcp 6 431996 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=216.58.201.131 sport=59140 dport=443 src= tcp 6 431993 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=52.44.211.134 sport=42430 dport=443 src=5 tcp 6 291 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=172.217.16.238 sport=52550 dport=443 src=172 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=74.125.140.189 sport=43698 dport=443 src=74. tcp tcp 6 263 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.8.144 dst=74.125.140.188 sport=43592 dport=5228 src=74 conntrack v1.4.4 (conntrack-tools): 17 flow entries have been shown.

https://blog.cloudflare.com/conntrack-tales-one-thousand-and-one-flows/

Network Intrusion Detection System

NIDS

- Can be in-path or on-path
- Can be passive or active
 - Log a report, inject RSTs, drop, ...
- Anomoly-based vs. rule-based
- Sometimes the line between firewall and NIDS is not clear
 - Typically firewalls operate in layers 3 and 4 and are in-path, typically NIDS operates in layers 3 through 7 and are on-path

Snort rule examples from https://cyvatar.ai/write-configure-snort-rules/ ...

Case 1: Securing Email Server With Snort Rules:

alert tcp 192.168.1.0/24 any -> 131.171.127.1 25 (content: "hacking"; msg: "malicious packet"; sid:2000001;)

Case 2: Detecting TCP SYN Floods

Alert tcp any any -> 192.168.10.5 443 (msg: "TCP SYN flood"; flags:!A; flow: stateless; detection_filter: track by_dst, count 70, seconds 10; sid:2000003;)

Case 3: Securing your Network against Conficker A Worm

alert tcp any any -> any 445 (msg: "conficker.a shellcode"; content: "|e8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c1|^|8d|N|10 80|1|c4|Af|81|9EPu|f5 ae c6 9d a0|0|85 ea|0|84 c8|0|84 d8|0|c4|0|9c cc|IrX|c4 c4 c4|, |ed c4 c4 c4 94|&<08|92|\;|d3|WG|02 c3|, |dc c4 c4 c4 f7 16 96 96|0|08 a2 03 c5 bc ea 95|\;|b3 c0 96 96 95 92 96|\;|f3|\;|24|i| 95 92|Q0|8f f8|0|88 cf bc c7 0f f7|2I|d0|w|c7 95 e4|0|d6 c7 17 f7 04 05 04 c3 f6 c6 86|D|fe c4 b1|1|ff 01 b0 c2 82 ff b5 dc b6 1b|0|95 e0 c7 1 cb|s|d0 b6|0|85 d8 c7 07|0|c0|T|c7 07 9a 9d 07 a4|fN|b2 e2|Dh|0c b1 b6 a8 a9 ab aa c4|]|e7 99 1d ac b0 b0 b4 fe eb eb|"; sid: 2000002; rev: 1;)

Case 4: Alerts of Buffer Overflow in BIND

alert tcp \$EXTERNAL_NET any -> \$HOME_NET 21 (msg:"FTP wuftp bad file completion attempt [";flow:to_server, established; content:"|?|"; content:"["; distance:1; reference:bugtraq,3581; reference:bugtraq,3707; reference:cve,2001-0550; reference:cve,2001-0886; classtype:miscattack; sid:1377; rev:14;)

Firewalls and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)

- Dual use technology
 - Network access controls
 - Security monitoring and response
 - Load balancing
 - NAT
 - VPNs
 - Surveillance ("userid=*, longlat=*")
 - Censorship ("falun")
 - Throttling ("twitter.com")
 - Targeted attacks ("HTTP GET cbjs.baidu.com/js/o.js")

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