



Brief overview of post-quantum cryptography CSE 548 Spring 2024 jedimaestro@asu.edu




#### Some videos...

- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_C5dkUiiQnw
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDdOoYdb748
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K026C5YaB3A




#### https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit\_experiment




used


Light from a green laser passing through two slits 0.4mm wide and 0.1mm apart


#### https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit\_experiment







https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elitzur%E2%80%93Vaidman\_bomb\_tester






#### Bomb is either live or a dud






"Due to the way in which the interferometer is constructed, a photon going through the second mirror from the lower path towards detector D will have a phase shift of half a wavelength compared to a photon being reflected from the upper path towards that same detector..."


#### Put C, *e.g.*, here...




#### Put D, *e.g.*, here...



# If both waves make it to the end (dud!)...




10




We will never detect a photon at D if the bomb is a dud.

(*I.e.*, if we detect a photon at D then the bomb is not a dud.)




### Case #1: Bomb is a dud

- Experiment will keep showing a photon detected at C
- Keep repeating until we're as sure as we want to be that the bomb is in fact a dud




#### Case #2: Bomb is live

- 50% chance photon takes the lower path
  - Boom!
- 50% chance the photon takes the upper path
  - 50% chance (25% conditional) that the single photon (no longer a wave) goes to detector C
    - Have to repeat
  - 50% chance (25% conditional) that the single photon (no longer a wave) goes to detector D




# Bomb is live (keep repeating)


- 2/3rds chance we blow ourselves up
- 1/3rd chance we eventually detect a photon at D
  - No boom, but we're certain the bomb is live



#### WTF?

- With a decent probability (1/3), we learn information about something that <u>could have happened but didn't</u>.
- Interaction free experiment
  - Possible in classical physics, e.g., I give you two envelopes and tell you a letter is in one and the other is empty, if you open one you know something about the other.
  - At quantum scales the letter is in a superposition of both envelopes until you observe it
    - These probabilities can be entangled






# Is superposition enough?

- As far as I know (but actual physicists are not in complete agreement on this) qubits have to be mutually entangled in very specific ways to implement useful quantum computations
  - Quantum decoherence is a major challenge

https://andisama.medium.com/qubit-an-intuition-2-inner-product-outer-product-and-tensor-product-in-bra-ket-notation-9d598cbd6bc



#### History of Quantum Entanglement

$$\left| \frac{\beta_{00}}{\delta_{00}} \right\rangle = \frac{\left| 00 \right\rangle + \left| 11 \right\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\left| \beta_{01} \right\rangle = \frac{\left| 01 \right\rangle + \left| 10 \right\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{array} \right)$$


•Normalized: 
$$\langle \boldsymbol{\beta}_{00} | \boldsymbol{\beta}_{00} \rangle = \frac{\langle 00 | + \langle 11 |}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \frac{|00 \rangle + |11 \rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (1+1) = 1$$


$$\left|\beta_{10}\right\rangle = \frac{\left|00\right\rangle - \left|11\right\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1\\0\\0\\-1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\left| \frac{\partial}{\partial u_1} \right\rangle = \frac{\left| 01 \right\rangle - \left| 10 \right\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ -1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$


•Orthogonal : 
$$\langle \boldsymbol{\beta}_{01} | \boldsymbol{\beta}_{00} \rangle = \frac{\langle 01 | + \langle 10 |}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \frac{|00 \rangle + |11 \rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$$
  
=  $\langle 0 | 0 \rangle \langle 1 | 0 \rangle + \langle 0 | 1 \rangle \langle 1 | 1 \rangle + \langle 1 | 0 \rangle \langle 0 | 0 \rangle + \langle 1 | 1 \rangle \langle 0 | 1 \rangle = 0$ 

• Expansion:  $|\alpha\beta\rangle = |\beta_{00}\rangle\langle\beta_{00}|\alpha\beta\rangle + |\beta_{01}\rangle\langle\beta_{01}|\alpha\beta\rangle + |\beta_{10}\rangle\langle\beta_{10}|\alpha\beta\rangle + |\beta_{11}\rangle\langle\beta_{11}|\alpha\beta\rangle$ 






https://www.cnet.com/tech/computing/quantum-computer-makers-like-their-odds-for-big-progress-soon/




#### What we need for the Internet to work...

- Symmetric
  - Encryption
  - Authentication
  - Secure hashes
  - Others?
- Asymmetric
  - Encryption
  - Non-repudiability (signatures)
  - Key exchange
  - Others? (e.g., homomorphic)




# Grover's algorithm

Grover diffusion operator




Repeat  $\approx \frac{\pi}{4}\sqrt{N}$  times

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grover%27s\_algorithm#/media/File:Grover's\_algorithm\_circuit.svg




# Symmetric crypto

- Just double the key size, we'll be okay (for the most part)...
  - $sqrt(2^{2n}) = 2^n$
  - $sqrt(2^{256}) = 2^{128}$




# Asymmetric Crypto


- Quantum computers seem to be good at the same kinds of things that make good, simple trapdoor functions for asymmetric crypto (factorization, discrete log, etc.)
  - But not everything
    - Older schemes (e.g., Merkle's signature scheme)
    - Newer schemes (e.g., lattice-based)



### Deutsh-Jozsa algorithm



 $https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsch\% E2\%80\%93 Jozsa\_algorithm\#/media/File: Deutsch-Jozsa-algorithm-quantum-circuit.png$ 




# 1-bit input case...

p = Probability of measuring |0>


$$|(1/2)(-1)^{f(0)} + (1/2)(-1)^{f(1)}|$$

An uneven function cancels itself out because of <u>destructive</u> interference


f(0)	f(1)	р
0	0	1
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1




# Shor's algorithm




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s\_algorithm#/media/File:Shor's\_algorithm.svg




#### https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRZQ-efABeQ






# HW 1.2 part (c)

- The sever had the private key and wouldn't share it with the attacker, but the attacker exploited a side channel to learn the plaintext bit-by-bit
  - Whether you realized it or not, what could have happened and didn't is as important to the flow of information in a padding oracle attack as what did happen
- Shor's algorithm is a little bit like that...
  - The universe knows what the factors are
    - The wrong answers cancel each other out



RSA, DH, ECDH, DSA, *etc.* all <u>broken</u>. Need something else instead...




# Lamport signature (1979)


- How to sign a 256-bit message digest...
  - Generate 512 random 256-bit integers (256 pairs of them)
    - Private key
  - For all 512 generate corresponding hash
    - Public key (single use)
  - When you want to sign something, reveal one unhashed private version per pair for corresponding to the bit being 0 or 1 (i.e., the first of the pair for 0, the other for 1)
    - 64 Kbits


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport\_signature

# Wiretap channel




# Quantum Key Distribution






### QKD vs. Quantum-resistant


- QKD uses quantum physics
- Quantum-resistant crypto is performed on classical computers using one-way trapdoor functions that we believe will resist cryptanalysis using quantum computers



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDdOoYdb748


Lattice-based cryptography: The tricky math of dots





#### Themes

- In schemes based on information theory or physics the eavesdropper has some noise or uncertainty the receiver doesn't have
  - We see this in post-quantum crypto (e.g., learning with errors)
- Quantum computers aren't necessarily faster at everything
  - There's usually a "trick at the end" where all the quantum information gets destroyed but the classical information measured still means something
  - Wrong answers cancel each other out via negative interference



# Why do we care?

- Even schemes with perfect forward secrecy aren't secure against a quantum computer if they're not quantum resistant
  - Can be recorded now, broken later
- TLS, HTTPS certificates, WPA2, WPA3, 4G, 5G, WhatsApp, *etc.* are currently not "future proofed" against quantum computers
  - Signal is, but only very recently