# Stream ciphers

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
# KRACK attacks...





# Outline

- Why stream ciphers?
- WEP
  - IVs reused because of birthday principle
- WPA2
  - IVs reused because of key re-installation (KRACK attacks)
- ShadowSocks
  - Redirection attack due to malleability
- Other examples



https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stream\_cipher.svg

## Good things about stream ciphers

- Can pre-compute key material, encryption/decryption is just XOR
- Can send small bursts without wasting space on padding
- More modular implementation in hardware
  - IV and key are only inputs
- Some stream ciphers that are not based on block ciphers are very fast
  - *E.g.*, RC4

# Playing with fire?

- You should NEVER reuse key material
  - Harder than it sounds
    - Handshake protocols, etc. might have replay attacks
    - APIs, education
    - Downgrade attacks
- You should NEVER assume that successful decryption is the same as authentication
  - Even worse to assume this than it is for block ciphers

### A theme we saw in asymmetric cryptography.

Crypto protocols and network protocols sometimes don't play nicely together. (Messages can be lost, modified, replayed, dropped, *etc.*)

### WEP

- IV is only 24 bits
- No real authentication
  - CRC is not a cryptographic hash function


#### "Wired Equivalent Privacy"


-Have to be physically in a building to plug in, have to know the passphrase to join WiFi (or do you?)

#### RC4, 40-bit key, 24-bit IV


#### Following are from:

https://jedcrandall.github.io/courses/cse468fall2022/wep/198fbe890b6 92e5296fcf7ad1b015e653ec9.pdf





If cipher-text & plain-text pair is known, their XOR is a keystream. Known plain-text (LLC/SNAP headers) in IP packets:



Can recover 8 bytes of keystream by eavesdropping a packet.

• Can encrypt (and transmit) 8 bytes of arbitrary data.




# Possible to create statistical biases in the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)

#### More info:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2o3Hs-JDWLs



#### **Crack WEP key in minutes...**



### WPA2

- IV is 48 bits (128-bit key with AES in a special counter mode called CCMP)
- SHA1 HMAC for authentication (called a MIC)
  - 160 bits




Figure 4: Key reinstallation attack against the 4-way handshake, when the supplicant (victim) still accepts plaintext retransmissions of message 3 if a PTK is installed.

### ShadowSocks

- Let's the user choose between non-AEAD and AEAD ciphers, with many options for each
  - AEAD = Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
  - Most implementations don't support AEAD
    - No authentication of messages

Following is from... https://www.idcoffer.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/Redirect-attack-on-Shadowsocks-stream-ciphers.pdf

#### Ciphers of shadowsocks:

Shadowsocks support the two kinds of ciphers:

Steam ciphers (none-AEAD cipher):

Rc4-md5, salsa20,chacha20,chacha-ietf, aes-ctf, bf-cfb, camellia-cfb, aes-cfb AEAD ciphers:

aes-gcm,chacha-ietf-poly1305,xchacha20-ietf-poly1305

### What is ShadowSocks?

The Shadowsocks local component (ss-local) acts like a traditional SOCKS5 server and provides proxy service to clients. It encrypts and forwards data streams and packets from the client to the Shadowsocks remote component (ss-remote), which decrypts and forwards to the target. Replies from target are similarly encrypted and relayed by ss-remote back to sslocal, which decrypts and eventually returns to the original client.

client <---> ss-local <--[encrypted]--> ss-remote <---> target

[target address][payload]

Addresses used in Shadowsocks follow the SOCKS5 address format:

#### [1-byte type][variable-length host][2-byte port]

The following address types are defned:


0x01: host is a 4-byte IPv4 address.

0x03: host is a variable length string, starting with a 1-byte length, followed by up to 255-byte domain name.

0x04: host is a 16-byte IPv6 address

The port number is a 2-byte big-endian unsigned integer.





Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode decryption

IVs are chosen randomly, transmitted in plaintext.

GET /html/en/reference/matrices/\_sources/sage/mat Host: doc.sagemath.org Connection: keep-alive Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,applicati Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8 Cookie: \_\_cfduid=ddc36b5813d7782ce467edb33058f732 \_\_utma=138969649.1329315963.1545386824.1545394846 sphinxsidebar=visible; \_gid=GA1.2.1229955866.1548 If-None-Match: W/"5c45d22a-127" If-Modified-Since: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 14:07:38 GMT

HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 09:59:47 GMT Connection: keep-alive Via: 1.1 varnish Cache-Control: max-age=600 ETag: W/"5c45d22a-127" Expires: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 10:09:47 GMT Age: 0

```
root@DESKTOP-3UNO8NU:/mnt/g/code/shadowsocks/decrypt# nc -1 -p 4626 >1.txt
^Z[10]
        Killed
                                nc -1 -p 4626 > 1.txt
[11]+ Stopped
                             nc -1 -p 4626 > 1.txt
root@DESKTOP-3UNO8NU:/mnt/g/code/shadowsocks/decrypt# cat 1.txt
1 304 Not 🖬. 🖬 🕼 Sat, 26 Jan 2019 07:15:21 GMT
Connection: close
Via: 1.1 varnish
Cache-Control: max-age=600
ETag: \/~5c45d22a-127~
Expires: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 06:59:41 GMT
Age: 0
X-Served-By: cache-pao17445-PAO
X-Cache: MISS
X-Cache-Hits: 0
X-Timer: S1548486922.795009,VS0,VE25
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Fast1y-Request-ID: 7f80e83d2fe5428bb3e38bb4e7d472af1b22eb4b
Server: cloudflare
CF-RAY: 49f1301d27589408-SJC
```


## Many other stream cipher fails...



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enigma\_machine#/media/File:Enigma\_(crittografia) - Museo\_scienza\_e\_tecnologia\_Milano.jpg



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type\_B\_Cipher\_Machine#/media/File:Photograph\_of\_RED\_cryptographic\_device\_-\_National\_Cryptologic\_Museum\_-\_DSC07863.JPG



https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/gsm-traffic-and-encryption-a5-1-stream-cipher/

## Content Scramble System (CSS)



# High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection



https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Apple\_TV,\_1st\_generation\_-\_mainboard\_-\_Silicon\_Image\_Sil1930CTU-3215.jpg



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