



# AES, cipherblock chaining modes, stream ciphers, and WiFi security

CSE 548 Spring 2025 jedimaestro@asu.edu




# Why study AES?

- It's a good demonstration of principles we've talked about (*e.g.*, confusion and diffusion).
- It's the workhorse of the majority of network crypto, *e.g.*, TLS
  - Is quantum safe (basically), so will be around for a while
- It's easy to see that AES is just substitution, permutation, and XOR




# Substitution HELLO WORLD TNWWX DXPWE




# Permutation

ABCD	ABDC	ACBD	ACDB	ADBC	ADCB
BACD	BADC	BCAD	BCDA	BDAC	BDCA
CABD	CADB	CBAD	CBDA	CDAB	CDBA
DABC	DACB	DBAC	DBCA	DCAB	DCBA




### Bitwise XOR

# $00101010_{b}$ $\oplus 10000110_{b}$ $= 10101100_{b}$




# Symmetric encryption over time (review)


- Handwritten notes, etc. for centuries
  - Typically the algorithm was secret
- 1883 ... Kerckhoff's rules
  - Now we know the key should be the only secret
- 1975 ... DES
  - Efficient in hardware, not in software
- 2001 ... AES
  - Efficient in software, and lots of different kinds of hardware



# Substitution Permutation Network


e.g., AES 128-bit blocks, (128-, 192-, 256-)bit key, (10, 12, 14) rounds






# AES


- Rijndael
  - Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen
- Very clever S-box design that comes from Kaisa Nyberg
  - Based on finite fields (a.k.a. Gallois fields)





# Finite fields

- In computer science, we like to pack things into the natural numbers between 0 and  $2^n 1$
- Would also be nice if things wrapped around and had other nice mathematical properties so we could pretend we didn't have this limitation
- Really nice if we don't waste any of the state space, *i.e.*, we use everything from 0 through 2<sup>n</sup> 1



### https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89variste\_Galois

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Quadratic\_equation

$$x=rac{-b\pm\sqrt{b^2-4ac}}{2a}$$

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Cubic\_equation

$$rac{a}{q}x^2+rac{bq+ap}{q^2}x+rac{cq^2+bpq+ap^2}{q^3}$$



## What is a field?



• "In mathematics, a field is a set on which addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are defined and behave as the corresponding operations on rational and real numbers do."

--Wikipedia

- In cryptography, we often want to "undo things" or get the same result two different ways
  - Math!
- On digital computers the math you learned in grade school is not good enough
  - Suppose we want to multiply by a plaintext, and the plaintext is 3. Great!
  - Now the decryption needs the inverse operation. Crap!
  - 1/3 is not easy to deal with (not even in floating point or fixed point)

## Field



Commutative

a + b = b + a a \* b = b \* a

• Associative

(a + b) + c = a + (b + c)(a \* b) \* c = a \* (b \* c)

• Identity

0 != 1, a + 0 = a, a \* 1 = a

- Inverse
  - a + -a = 0 a \* a<sup>-1</sup> = 1

Distributive

a \* (b + c) = (a \* b) + (a \* c)





- Want to define a field over  $2^k$  possibilities for a k-bit number
- 2 is prime, all other powers of 2 are not
  - Need to use irreducible polynomials



# https://jedcrandall.github.io/courses/ cse548spring2024/miniaesspec.pdf

Published in Cryptologia, XXVI (4), 2002.

### Mini Advanced Encryption Standard (Mini-AES): A Testbed for Cryptanalysis Students

Raphael Chung-Wei Phan

### 2.1 The Finite Field GF(2<sup>4</sup>)



The nibbles of Mini-AES can be thought of as elements in the finite field  $GF(2^4)$ . Finite fields have the special property that operations  $(+,-, \times \text{ and } \div)$  on the field elements always cause the result to be also in the field. Consider a nibble  $n = (n_3, n_2, n_1, n_0)$  where  $n_i \in \{0,1\}$ . Then, this nibble can be represented as a polynomial with binary coefficients i.e having values in the set  $\{0,1\}$ :

 $n = n_3 x^3 + n_2 x^2 + n_1 x + n_0$ 

Example 1

Given a nibble, n = 1011, then this can be represented as  $n = 1 x^3 + 0 x^2 + 1 x + 1 = x^3 + x + 1$ 

Note that when an element of GF(2<sup>4</sup>) is represented in polynomial form, the resulting polynomial would have a degree of at most 3.



### 2.2 Addition in GF(2<sup>4</sup>)

When we represent elements of  $GF(2^4)$  as polynomials with coefficients in  $\{0,1\}$ , then addition of two such elements is simply addition of the coefficients of the two polynomials. Since the coefficients have values in  $\{0,1\}$ , then the addition of the coefficients is just modulo 2 addition or exclusive-OR denoted by the symbol  $\oplus$ . Hence, for the rest of this paper, the symbols + and  $\oplus$  are used interchangeably to denote addition of two elements in  $GF(2^4)$ .

### Example 2

Given two nibbles, n = 1011 and m = 0111, then the sum, n + m = 1011 + 0111 = 1100 or in polynomial notation:

$$n + m = (x^3 + x + 1) + (x^2 + x + 1) = x^3 + x^2$$



### 2.3 Multiplication in GF(2<sup>4</sup>)

Multiplication of two elements of GF(2<sup>4</sup>) can be done by simply multiplying the two polynomials. However, the product would be a polynomial with a degree possibly higher than 3.

Example 3 Given two nibbles, n = 1011 and m = 0111, then the product is:  $(x^{3} + x + 1)(x^{2} + x + 1) = x^{5} + x^{4} + x^{3} + x^{3} + x^{2} + x + x^{2} + x + 1$  $= x^{5} + x^{4} + 1$ 

In order to ensure that the result of the multiplication is still within the field GF(2<sup>4</sup>), it must be reduced by division with an irreducible polynomial of degree 4, the remainder of which will be taken as the final result. An irreducible polynomial is analogous to a prime number in arithmetic, and as such a polynomial is irreducible if it has no divisors other than 1 and itself. There are many such irreducible polynomials, but for Mini-AES, it is chosen to be:

$$m(x) = x^4 + x + 1$$



### Example 4

Given two nibbles, n = 1011 and m = 0111, then the final result after multiplication in GF(2<sup>4</sup>), called the 'product of  $n \times m$  modulo m(x)' and denoted as  $\otimes$ , is:

$$(x^3 + x + 1) \otimes (x^2 + x + 1) = x^5 + x^4 + 1 \mod x^4 + x + 1$$
  
=  $x^2$ 

This is because:

$$x^{4} + x + 1 \int \frac{x+1}{x^{5} + x^{4} + 1}$$
(quotient)  
$$\underbrace{\frac{+ x^{5} + x^{2} + x}{x^{4} + x^{2} + x + 1}}_{\frac{+ x^{4} + x + 1}{x^{2}}}$$
(remainder)

Note that since the coefficients of the polynomials are in {0,1}, then addition is simply exclusive-OR and hence subtraction is also exclusive-OR since exclusive-OR is its own inverse.



8	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Α	В	С	D	E	F
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Α	В	С	D	E	F
2	0	2	4	6	8	Α	С	E	3	1	7	5	В	9	F	D
3	0	3	6	5	С	F	Α	9	В	8	D	E	7	4	1	2
4	0	4	8	С	3	7	В	F	6	2	E	Α	5	1	D	9
5	0	5	Α	F	7	2	D	8	Е	В	4	1	9	С	3	6
6	0	6	С	Α	В	D	7	1	5	3	9	F	E	8	2	4
7	0	7	E	9	F	8	1	6	D	Α	3	4	2	5	С	В
8	0	8	3	В	6	E	5	D	С	4	F	7	Α	2	9	1
9	0	9	1	8	2	В	3	Α	4	D	5	С	6	F	7	E
Α	0	Α	7	D	E	4	9	3	F	5	8	2	1	В	6	С
В	0	В	5	E	Α	1	F	4	7	С	2	9	D	6	8	3
С	0	С	В	7	5	9	E	2	Α	6	1	D	F	3	4	8
D	0	D	9	4	1	С	8	5	2	F	В	6	3	E	Α	7
E	0	E	F	1	D	3	2	С	9	7	6	8	4	Α	В	5
F	0	F	D	2	9	6	4	8	1	E	С	3	8	7	5	Α



### An alternative to AES: Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) - Feistel structure with 32 rounds

#include <stdint.h>

```
void encrypt (uint32 t v[2], const uint32 t k[4]) {
   uint32 t delta=0x9E3779B9;
                            /* a key schedule constant */
   uint32_t k0=k[0], k1=k[1], k2=k[2], k3=k[3]; /* cache key */
                          /* basic cycle start */
   for (i=0; i<32; i++) {</pre>
       sum += delta;
       v0 += ((v1 << 4) + k0) \land (v1 + sum) \land ((v1 >> 5) + k1);
       v1 += ((v0 <<4) + k2) \land (v0 + sum) \land ((v0 >>5) + k3);
                                              /* end cycle */
   }
   v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1;
void decrypt (uint32 t v[2], const uint32 t k[4]) {
   uint32 t v0=v[0], v1=v[1], sum=0xC6EF3720, i; /* set up; sum is (delta << 5) & 0xFFFFFFF */</pre>
   uint32 t delta=0x9E3779B9; /* a key schedule constant */
   uint32_t k0=k[0], k1=k[1], k2=k[2], k3=k[3]; /* cache key */
                         /* basic cycle start */
   for (i=0; i<32; i++) {
       v1 = ((v0 <<4) + k2) (v0 + sum) ((v0 >>5) + k3);
       v\Theta = ((v1 << 4) + k\Theta) \land (v1 + sum) \land ((v1 >> 5) + k1);
       sum -= delta;
                                              /* end cycle */
   v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1;
```

# AES S-box requirements

- Can't pull it out of our &%# like the NSA did for DES
- Should have good nonlinear properties
  - Better nonlinearity means fewer rounds
- Should be reversible
  - Don't want to use a Feistel structure for performance reasons

### https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaisa\_Nyberg




# AES

- 128-bit blocks, 128-, 192-, or 256-bit keys
  - 10, 12, or 14 rounds respectively
- No less secure than the other candidates, but better performance...
  - In hardware and software
    - Different word sizes (8, 16, 32, 64)
  - With or without specialized hardware support
    - E.g., Gallois Fields on Blackfin DSPs
    - *E.g.*, AES special instruction set on Intel chips


# Cipher modes

- ECB, CBC discussed in the next slides
- Also Counter Mode, Galois Counter Mode, Cipher Feedback, Output Feedback, more...
  - Parallelization, message authentication, and other features
  - Can make stream ciphers out of block ciphers




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

Image stolen from Wikipedia



# ECB is generally bad






Original image

Encrypted using ECB mode

Modes other than ECB result in pseudo-randomness

The image on the right is how the image might appear encrypted with CBC, CTR or any of the other more secure modes—indistinguishable from random noise. Note that the random appearance of the image on the right does not ensure that the image has been securely encrypted; many kinds of insecure encryption have been developed which would produce output just as "random-looking".

Image stolen from Wikipedia



# Good things about stream ciphers

- Can pre-compute key material, encryption/decryption is just XOR
- Can send small bursts without wasting space on padding
- More modular implementation in hardware
  - IV and key are only inputs
- Some stream ciphers that are not based on block ciphers are very fast
  - *E.g.*, RC4

### Who cares about the local physical layer?

-Example 1: Poor transport-layer security

-Example 2: ARP cache poisoning

### WiFi security

-WEP, WPA, WPA2, WPA3

### Other applications of radio signals

- 3G, 4G, 5G, 900 Mhz, Bluetooth, ...



### WiFi security

### **Basically three use cases**

-Open

-Personal (e.g., a passphrase)

-Enterprise

https://securityuncorked.com/2022/07/wifi-security-the-3-types-of-wifi-networks/

### WiFi security in a nutshell

### WEP is very, very bad (see stream cipher slides)

Can be broken in seconds/minutes

### WPA was only a stop gap

RC4 hardware

### WPA2 is maybe okay for now if you do it right?

Notion of personal **vs.** enterprise introduced here KRACK attacks

### WPA3 is better, maybe?

Dragonblood attacks

Open no longer means just "unencrypted"




-https://www.krackattacks.com/

-https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/10/16/falling-through-the-kracks/




Crypto protocol and handshake



A. Agrawal, U. Chatterjee and R. Maiti, "CheckShake: Passively Detecting Anomaly in Wi-Fi Security Handshake Using Gradient Boosting Based Ensemble Learning" in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 20, no. 06, pp. 4868-4880, 2023.


34



# Dragonblood attacks on WPA3

- Downgrade attacks (enterprise)
- Side channel (personal)
- Slides plagiarized from...

https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wac2019-slides.pdf




### Convert password to MODP element

for (counter = 1; counter < 256; counter++)
value = hash(pw, counter, addr1, addr2)
if value >= p: continue

 $\mathsf{P} = value^{(p-1)/q}$ 


return P

16




## Leaked information: #iterations needed







### Leaked information: #iterations needed











# Long list of stream cipher fails...

• WEP, WPA, WPA2, 2G, CSS, HDMI content protection, XBox, ShadowSocks, Enigma, RED, Purple, ...



# *Cryptography Engineering* by Ferguson *et al.*



Niels Ferguson Bruce Schneier Tadayoshi Kohno